NIGER DELTA UNIVERSITY

WILBERFORCE ISLAND, BAYELSA STATE

24TH INAUGURAL LECTURE

NIGERIA WITHOUT OIL: THE 'CAABA' MODEL OF RECONSTRUCTING LOCAL ECONOMY OF THE NIGER DELTA REGION.

BY

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DEDICATION

This Inaugural Lecture is dedicated to Late Chief (Dr) Harold Jeneiwari Roland Dappa-Biriye (CON), Patriarch of the Niger Delta, and my parents, Late Chief Arufagu & Mrs. Rebecca Etekpe for their nurture and care to this level.

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Ladies and Gentlemen.

1 INTRODUCTION

1) An Overview This inaugural Lecture is treated under four broad sections, beginning with this introduction where I have outlined the aims and assumptions, issues, history of crude oil and gas in Nigeria and how the discovery in 1956 has led to *oil-impedes-local economy* hypothesis in the Niger Delta region (NDR). It also unraveled how oil has impoverished the region (Azaiki, 2009 and Ibaba & Etekpe, 2013), as well as made the Nigerian state less democratic, i.e. oil-impedes-democracy hypothesis, (Parenti, 1974, Ross, N, 2001 and Ikein, A. 2014). I then draw on my earlier case studies to explain how oil resource has contributed to the gross domestic product (GDP) and sustained the national economy and at the same time a curse to the oil producing communities (OPCs) in the region (Ibaba & Etekpe, 2009: 177-190), Akpan & Etekpe, 2006:26-40), Etekpe, 2009: 40-42; and Etekpe, 2011).

The curse is most pronounced on the local economy NDR that was predominately agriculture (i.e, farming), with the disarticulation of the local economy, the people now rely basically on oil revenue. This system of over reliance on oil revenue cannot continue for another 50 years as oil is expected

to dry-up. Thus, the country should start preparing for post-oil era to begin by 2067 (i.e, 50 years from now).

The third section presents a model, known as *communal-agro allied-based agriculture* (CAABA) model, for reconstructing the devastated local economy of the region that shall be worst hit without oil (Nussbaum, 1983, and Etekpe, 2016). The model is formulated as a compass for Nigeria to survive without oil by 2067 when crude oil is expected to either dry-up or the price becomes so ridiculously low that it will no longer sustain the local, state and national economies in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The signs are already here, especially as the developed countries are fervently searching for alternative energy to fossil (oil) (Nussbaum, 1983). Thus, the model is a conscious measure to prepare the region/country out of the pending doom without oil (Isoun, TT and Isoun, M, 2013).

The section shares the experiences of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta state on the subject. The former governor of Delta State, Dr. Emmanuel Eweton Uduagha, seems to have studied my preliminary reports on the subject to have started a similar programme – *Delta beyond oil* in 2014. Whereas the Delta experience is slightly

different as it is mainly on micro-businesses, it is useful to the CAABA model. The concluding section (Four) draws useful lessons, and emphasized the need for Nigeria to plan now on 'what it wants to be after oil by 2067' (Omoh, 2014:1-2 and Oyedeji, 2016).

2) **The Proposition:** The papers adopts the proposition that 'there is a strong relationship between CAABA model and economic survival of the region/country without oil by 2067'. Accordingly, the address shall concentrate on *CAABA model* to reconstruct the bartered local economy, with emphasis on agriculture (i.e., crop, trees, and fish farming, and assess its adequacy in satisfying three major areas, namely:

a) life support (i.e., food security);

b) employment generation; and

c) raw materials for industries, beginning with small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), to medium scale enterprises (MSEs) and large scale enterprises (LSEs).

3) **Aims:** The main aims of the paper are:

a) to repositioning the region and country for non-oil economy from 2067 by investing in agro-and-agro allied industry.

b) to present CAABA model as a veritable framework to reconstruct post-oil era's local economies in Nigeria, especially NDR, and
c) to encourage scholars and policy makers to research on *oil-impedes-local economy* hypothesis and its implications on post-oil economy in the region/country.

4) **Assumptions:** The study is based on the following assumptions:
a) that crude oil (and gas) is finite resource and shall dry-up by 2067 (i.e, 50 years from now);
b) that even if it does not completely dry-up by 2067, the price shall be so low that its contribution to GDP shall be so insignificant that it shall no longer sustain the local, state and national economies, especially NDR;
c) that CAABA model is the take-off stage and shall drive the region/national economies without reliance from proceeds from crude oil and
d) federal, state and local governments shall embrace the model at their respective levels of government.

5) **Expectations:** The model is expected:
a) to stimulate export of different kinds of processed agricultural goods to African countries, Europe and

the United State of America (USA) in line with the framework of African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA);
b) to enhance human capacity development, peace and security in the region; and
c) to provide food, raw materials for SMEs, MSEs , LSEs and employment.

6) **Scope:** The study is not a critique of the on-going debate on 'development and under-development' of NDR (Ikein, 2014: 8-20), or the 'evils of the 20 multinational oil companies (MNOCs) operating in the region (Azaiki, 2009). Rather, the work is centered on preparing the region and country for post-oil (and gas) era (Darah, 2004 and 2014, 15-18), and the emphasis is on crude oil and not gas. This is understandable considering the long history of oil production (Table 2) and its adverse effects on the local and national economies.

7) **Clarification of Concept:** The concept, Niger Delta, has been re-defined, severally from what Henry Willink Commission report stated in 1958. The Commission (1958:96) defined it as territories that comprised the 'defunct Rivers province, Degema and Western Ijaw (Ijo) divisions except Port Harcourt and

Ahoada'. By this definition, the region comprised Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta (BRD) states. This concept was altered by the Presidential Directive No. 1 of 1992 that established the Oil Minerals Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC). The directive expanded the concept to include the present Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Edo and Delta (BRACED) states based on geographical contiguity (Talbot, 1926; Alagoa, 2005:11-14; and Etekpe, 20007a, 57).

As if this was not enough, the former President Olusegun Obasanjo went further to introduce Abia, Imo and Ondo (AIO) states in the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Bill in 2000. Inspite of protests coordinated by the South-South Peoples Conference (SSOPEC) against their inclusion as part of delta, the President Obasanjo stood his ground. By this, the NDDC Act, 2000 're-defined the Niger Delta to comprise nine oil and gas producing states in Nigeria' This has made the concept to be synonymous with oil and gas production.

This should not be so because as Etekpe (2007a:2-3 and 2009:1-2) pointed out in his study of the 10 major deltas of the world (Table 1):

There are distinctive characteristics (generics)

Table 1: Major Deltas of the World

S/No	Name (in order of size)	Location (country & continent	Resources Oil (√) non-oil (x)
1	Mekong delta	China – Asia	√
2	Mississippi delta	United States of America – North America	√
3	Niger delta	Nigeria - Africa	√
4	Nile delta	Egypt – Africa	√
5	Yangtze delta	China – Asia	√
6	Pearl- delta	China – Asia	X
7	Okavango delta	Angola – Africa	X
8	Orinoco delta	Venezuela – South America	√
9	Mahakam delta	Indonesia – Asia	√
10	Mackenzie delta	Canada – North America	√

Source: Etekpe, A (2009:1), " Policy Option and Adaptation: A Comprehensive study of the Niger Delta and other Deltas of the World" Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State, Nigeria, Monograph Series, No. 003

Table 1 further shows that out of the 10 deltas, two (Pearl and Okavango deltas) do not produce oil (and gas). Conversely, out of the 11 members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting countries (OPEC), Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Libya are located in the desert (not deltaic region). The foregoing discussion is clear that Obasanjo is wrong by introducing AIO states in the NDDC Act, 2000 by making oil production as synonymous with delta.

Thus, the Act has created two Niger deltas – historical (environmental) and political. While the historical (environment) Niger delta region comprise BRACED states; that of the political is made up of 'BRACED states, plus AIO states'. The AIO states are, no doubt, oil/gas producing states but not part of the Niger delta since any state or region can produce oil and gas without necessarily a delta. This distinction is consistent with the position of several scholars and practitioners on the subject (Talbot 1932); Rosevear, 1947; Alagoa, 2005; Ibaba, 2003, and Etekpe, 2007).

This study is concerned about the historical (environmental) Niger delta region that is now synonymous with the South-South geo-political zone. The Niger delta is the third largest deltas of the world (Table 1) and the richest part of Nigeria, in terms of, natural resources. The area has large oil and gas deposits, as well as extensive forests, good agricultural land and abundant fish resources. It is 70,000 square kilometers (i.e., 40,000 square miles), and the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) added another 200 nautical miles to it in 1995. According to Abayagbon (2012:18),' "Nigeria has again applied to the UN Commission on extension of continental shelf (ECS) to extend the present continental shelf to 350

nautical miles (612.5 kilometer). The major ethnic nationalitiues in the region are Ijo (Ijaw), Efik, Ibibio, Urhobo, Itsekiri, Isoko, Bini, Ikwerre, Ogoni, etc, covering about 3,000 oil producing communities (OPCs) (Talbot, 1926 & 1932).

8) The Local Economy of the region.

The people think the Niger Delta region has only crude oil and gas. This is not so. The region has 70,000 square kilometers of mangrove trees suitable for 70 different industrial products, including adhesive, grease, shoes and foot wears (Dadiowei, 2006). There are also plantations for oil palm, rubber, rice, lead zinc, limestone, salt, bitumen, etc. spread across the region. Traditionally, the fish (subsistence farming) and forest resources have been the basis of human livelihood and development (in the region). Fishing is the main occupation in the coastal sandy barrier and mangrove swamp zones (Ikporukpo, 2011). The people in the low rain forest and freshwater swamp zones practice subsistence farming, along with lumbering.

The region, especially Bayelsa state has some of the biggest groves of bitter cola in Africa, and raw materials for social and medicinal products (Onosode, 2003). In 1961, the defunct Niger Delta Development

Board (NDDB) started a rice farm in Peremabiri, Isampou, and Abobiri in Southern Ijaw in the present Bayelsa state. The farms were adequate to meet the local consumption and export (Redefliff, 1990). In 1970, the old Rivers state government secured an African Development Bank (ADB) loan to set up Risonpalm – the largest palm oil plantation in Africa, at Ubima (Rivers state) and Elebele (now in Bayuelsa state). The World Bank studied the two farms (i.e., rice and palm oil plantation) and "found that the rice farms were capable of meeting the rice need of the entire West Africa sub-region….. and Risonpalm has the installed capacity to supply red oil to most of the African countries..,.", but noted that the "Peremabiri, Isampoum, and Abobiri rice farms and Risonpalm plantation at Ubiama and Elebele have been grossly under-utilized. The projects, alone, were capable of directly employing 80,500 Rivers and Bayelsans, with positive trickle-down effects on 1.25 million families within the past 3 years but were abandoned. They are basically failed projects" (World Bank Report, 2011). This meant that without crude oil and gas, Rivers and Bayelsa states can run robust local economies on rice, palm oil and kernels, and palm kernel oil and cake (PKO/PKC).

It is unfortunate that the rice farms, palm oil estates, and other occupations have given way to oil and gas industry. While many factors may be responsible for the disarticulation of the local economies (occupations), the most prominent one is oil spillage. The unabated spills have devalued farm lands, as well as caused loss of bio-diversity and pollution of water resources that have reduced fishermen/women catch (Okolo and Etekpe, 2010). All these have resulted in the loss of the people's means of livelihood, and it has now dawned on the people that the 'abandoned' local economies at the wake of the oil boom in 1973 has to be resuscitated to be able to absorb the repentant militants and those unemployed youth that have not yet joined militancy for peace to reign in the region.

Despite the numerous natural and human resource base

> *the region's potential for sustainable development remains unfulfilled and its future (without oil) is threatened …. Sixty-one years of oil development in the region has not brought significant benefits to the people (Moff & Linden, 1995:7-8).*

Below, is a brief history of multinational oil companies (MNOCs) in Nigeria, their contributions to GDP and development, as well as the effects on local and national economies.

2 BRIEF HISTORY OF MNOCS OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA

1) **Discovery and spread of Oil wells and MNOCs:** Etekpe (2007a) has traced the history of crude oil and gas to Edwin L. Drake of Titusville ion the state of Pennsylvania, USA, in 1859. Drake, a retired railroad conductor and pioneer of oil and gas industry in the world , struck the first oil well in the world by using an old steam engine to drill a 22 meter – deep well to discover crude oil. The experiment became the beginning of oil exploration and exploitation in the world (Larson, 2005:4-5). While oil was later discovered in several other parts of USA and the world, some wells rapidly exhausted (dried up). That was the experience of Drake, whose wells also dried up and he became impoverished.

By 1870, John D Rockefeller and his associates established the Standard Oil Company (SOC), and Marcus Samuel founded the Royal Dutch Shell Group. Since then, there have been several alliances and

organizations in the industry to avoid instability in oil price and production that happened at Drake's era (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 1999). One of such organization is OPEC (11 countries) whose collective proven oil reserves stood at 1,172 billion barrels in 2014. The 7 non-OPEC countries, on the other hand, have a total oil reserves of 507 billion barrels (Larson, 2005:4-6).

In Nigeria, the run-down of oil (and gas) exploration and exploitation were as follows (Table 2)

Table 2: History of crude oil and gas exploration in Nigeria.

S/No	Year	MNOC	Activities	Location
1	1908- 1938	Nigerian Bitumen Corporation	Shallow drilling from heavy oil seeps in outcrops of the cretaceous sands	Owerri area
2	1937 – 1940	Shell BP	Reconnaissance work by geological team.	"
3	1946 – 1950	Shell BP	Intensive geological and geophysical surveys	"
4	1951	Shell BP	First deep test, and it was dry	"
5	1952 – 1955	Shell BP	Drilling cretaceous prospects with disappointing results	"
6	1953	Shell BP	Drilling in the Niger Delta and struck the first oil well, known as Akata -1 well	Oloibiri area, Niger delta region
7	1956	Shell BP	Drilling and discovery of first oil and gas in Oloibiri in Brass Division, now Ogbia Local Govermment on 04 June 1956	"
8	1956 – 1958	Shell BP	Intensive regional exploratory activity in the territory of the region, and first export of 8,500 tons to Rotterdam, UK.	"
9	1961 – 1962	Gulf, Shell –BP, Amoseas and Mobil	Off-shore license granted to them to explore and exploit crude oil and gas in the region and country.	"

Source: Etekpe, A.(2007a:4). The Politics and Conflicts Over Oil and Gas in the Niger Delta Region…. Port Harcourt, TowerGate Resources.

The Table 2 show that while oil was struck in Oloibiri in 1956, it was until 1958 when the first commercial quantity of

8,500 tons was exported to Rotterdam, United Kingdom (UK). This marked Nigeria's entry into the world oil club and the transformation of our local agrarian economy into petro-dollar-driven economy. Today, Nigeria has a total crude oil reserves of about 39.40 billion barrels, making it to be ranked as the 12th largest world producers of oil. In addition, Nigeria has half trillion cubic feet of gas. Going forward, there are about 1,350 oil wells so far declared by the MNOCs as at 2015. Of this number, Rivers (416 wells), and Bayelsa (546 wells) states account for 962 wells. By 2015, there were 20 major MNOCs operating in Nigeria mainly in the Niger delta region (NDR)(Table 3).

Table 3: MNOCs Operating as Nigeria at 2015.

S/No	Name of Company	Year
1	Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd.(SPDC)	1937
2	Tenneco Oil Company of Nigeria (Sold to NAOC after civil war)	1953
3	Chevron Producing Nigeria Unlimited	1955
4	Chevron (formerly Gulf) Nigeria Limited	1961
5	Texaco Overseas Nigeria	1961
6	Elf Petroleum Nigeria Ltd	1962
7	Phillips Pan Ocean Oil Company	1964
8	SAFRAP	1966
9	Nigerian Agip Oil Company Ltd. (NAOC)	1972
10	Agip Energy and Natural Resources	1992
11	State Oil/BP Alliance	1992
12	Esso Exploration and Production Ltd.	1992
13	Texaco Outer Shelf Nigeria Ltd.	1992
14	Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Ltd.	1992
15	Total Nigeria Exploration and Production Ltd.	1992
16	Amacco Corporation Ltd.	1992
17	Chevron Exploration and Production Ltd.	1992
18	Bough Asland Oil Nigeria Ltd.	1993
19	Conoco Oil Ltd.	2000
20	Abacan Petroleum Limited.	2000

Source: Etekpe, A.(2007a:4). The Politics and Conflicts Over Oil and Gas in the Niger Delta Region…. Port Harcourt, TowerGate Resources.

2) **Contributions of Oil to GDP:** The Oil (and gas) industry in Nigeria grew in relevance and revenue to the country, and I have summarized such contributions to the gross domestic product (GDP) and compared it with the non-oil revenue sector

between 2012 and 2016. There is no doubt, the oil wealth helped to maintain a relatively steady economic growth. It accounted for about 95 percent of the annual budgets and 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings of Nigeria since the oil boom in 1973.

In view of such a huge contribution of about a third to the country's GDP it (GDP) grew from 6 percent in 2008 to 8.4 percent in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). The contributions (Table 4) averaged at about 75 percent between 2009 and 2014, but started falling from 2015, due mainly to the volatile nature of world oil price (Agbo, 2016:10).

Table 4: Schedule of Oil and Non-Oil Revenue in Nigeria (N,000,000)

Description	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Oil Revenue	8,025,953	8,240,545	8,950,445	8,592,427	7,647,260
Non-Oil Revenue	2,628,771	2,740,601	2,830,241	2,717,031	2,418,158
Total Revenue	10,654,725	10,981,146	11,780,685	11,309,458	10,065,418
% of Oil Revenue	75.4%	75.0%	76.0%	72.1%	61.02%

Source: Etekpe, A.(2007a:4). The Politics and Conflicts Over Oil and Gas in the Niger Delta Region…. Port Harcourt, TowerGate Resources.

3) **The Effects of Oil on Local Economy:** Notwithstanding, the contributions of oil in Table 4, oil has brought to the OPCs in the region poverty, diseases, strange ailments from acid rain, persisted pollution and environmental degradation. But, the worst hit areas is the 'local economy' – agriculture. Sagay(2015) seems to summarize the discussion when he wrote:

> *The cumulative effects of oil production in the region are: disempowerment, disarticulation, alienation, pauperization and immiscrisation the people against the spirit of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of the state policy.*

He then concluded that the region's environment is so degraded that it is already endangering the livelihood and health of the people. For Ikporukpo (2005), "the over 3,000 OPCs in the region have realized that while

oil bring prosperity to other deltas of the world, in the peculiar case of Nigeria, it is a source of poverty, depression, despairs, decay and bartered economy." Indeed, the level of environmental degradation with its adverse effects on the local economy has become worrisome. In 2003, for example, Mobil Producing Unlimited oil spill destroyed the ecosystem of several parts of Qua Ibo river in Akwa Ibom state. In 2004, the former governor of Rivers state, Dr. Peter Odili obliged SPDC to clean up over 250 cases of oil spillage in the state.

I found that a minimum of 1.4 standard cubic feet (scf) of gas is flared every day in the region since 2004. This generates 45.8 billion kilo watts of heat per day, leading: to atmospheric pollution, causes acidic rain and culminates in a number of disease, including skin cancer. Incidentally, the Federal Office of Statistics (FOS) reported in December 2015 that the penalty per day of flaring gas is a meager amount of N100/cubic feet.

Figure 1, Gas Flaring in NDR

Figure 2, Oil pipelines in NDR

The resultant effects of the foregoing are: very low crop yield, diminished fish catch and devastated farm lands/forests that have led to loss of means of livelihood in the region. In essence, the local farmers in the region have abandoned their occupations in search of petro-dollar. This has accounted for the FOS' report that the region's unemployment and under-employment stood at 22.45 million in 2015, about 9.1 percent or 1.75 million higher than 2014. This figure (22.45 million) is about 45 percent of the overall national unemployment of 50 million in 2015. The poverty rate, on the other hand, was 75.4 percent in 2015, which was above the national rate of 61.3 percent. The other Human Development Indices (HDI) are very frightening, Incidentally, SPDC admits that "majority of the 30 million people living in the

region remain poor and unemployment is high, leading to frustration that spurred perennial youth unrest targeted at MNOCs" Shell in Nigeria, 2010: 1-2).

The disarticulation of the region's economy is a violation of our human rights, since, "human rights, "as Pope Francis(2015) explains, "are not only violated by terrorism, but also by unfair economic structures that create huge inequalities". The position of Pope Francis might have informed Omoh (2014) to draw our attention to how local, states and federal governments in Nigeria were on each other's neck between August and October 2014 over shortfalls in revenue allocation from the federation accounts. The scenario became worst in 2016 where 35 states (with exception of Lagos state) government panicked that they were unable to meet their financial obligations to their workers as the federation account continued to dwindle due to the shortfall in oil revenue. For Omoh (2014:1), "it is a shame that state governments are not seeing the opportunity that the shortfall is offering them to think and act to remove their states from the shackles of oil". He concluded that "for a long time the signals have been showing that the Nigerian economy cannot continue to run on revenue from crude oil.

4) **Effects of Oil on the National Economy:** Whereas oil has so much contributed (Table 4), Nwankwo, Abraham, director-general (DG) of Debt Management Office (DMO) told the Nigerian Senate on 16 February 2017 that "the total external and domestic debts of the federal, state and Federal Capital Territory (FTC) has risen from N5.16 billion (US$4.3 billion) in 2010 to N17.386.14 trillion (US$57.38 billion) at an exchange rate of $1 to N302.00 as at 31 December 2016 (Etekpe, 2012: 2-3; and Bayewu, 2016: 23). The amount was made up of N3,454.20 trillion (US $11.4 billion) external and N13,931.94 trillion (US$45.98 billion) domestic debts,. Between 2015 and 2016 alone, the external debt of the federal government rose from US$ 10.71 billion (2015) to US$11.4 billion (2016), representing an increase of 6.53 percent (Bayewu, 2016: 23). Earlier, the DMO approved US$ 29.96 billion external borrowing plan of the federal government, but was rejected by the Nigerian Senate as the country's debt profile has risen far beyond the debt former President Obasanjo administration sought right off (Etekpe, 2012:21-6).

The scenario reinforces the "*oil-impedes-local economy*" hypothesis as the high debt profile has 'injured' the national economy, with resultant effects on the local

economy of the region. The statistics in 2016, for example, was gloomy and may not be better in 2017 as;

a) Nigeria lost over US$ 4.7 billion to oil theft and pipeline vandalism;
b) SPDC relocates Kolo Creek – Soku gas pipeline;
c) Global gas market face volatility amidst low investments;
d) US exports fill Asia's liquefied natural gas (NLG) demand gas; and
e) Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) recorded a total loss of N197.50 billion.

Entwistle (2016:24), former US Ambassador in Nigeria, seems to summarize the analysis when he stated that:

> *While Nigeria is considered to be Africa's wealthiest nation, mainly due to its resources (oil/gas), the country's real wealth is its people. And the other commodity is agriculture for food and raw materials because Nigerians are dying of starvation….*

He then urged the Nigerian government to diversify

the economy and increase export in agro-allied products in line with the principle of AGOA.

Etebeke (2016) decried how Nigeria is "massively importing food, especially, wheat, fish and sugar". The four items accounts for "a whopping sum of N1 trillion loss to the nation annually". In corroborating with Etebeke, Professor Baba Abubakar, Executive Secretary, Agricultural Research Council of Nigeria (ARCN), emphasized, "Nigeria had remained a large food importer, inspite of massive uncultivated agricultural land across the country. As he puts it:

> *Nigeria is the largest importer of USA had red and white wheat worth N635 billion annually; world's No. 2 importer of rice at N356 billion; N217 billion on sugar and N97 billion on fish.*

Table 5 shown 4 selected agricultural produce – production, export and importation in Nigeria

Table 5: Selected Agricultural Production, Export and Imports in Nigeria, 2011-2016

Produce	Quantity in metric tons (,000,000)				
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
a) Production					
Rice	4.61	5.43	4.82	6.73	8.25
Wheat	0.20	0.10	0.08	0.07	0.050
Maize	8.88	8.69	8.42	10.79	12.61
Soybeans	0.49	0.65	0.52	0.679	0.510
b) Export					
Rice	0.0094	0.0017	0.000	0.0015	0.0012
Wheat	0.0029	0.0272	0.0111	0.0100	0.008
Maize	0.0008	0.0008	0.0008	0.0008	0.0007
Soybeans	0.0110	0.0008	0.0114	0.0008	0.006
c) Imports					
Rice	1.88	2,19	2.46	2.19	2.5
Wheat	3.97	4.04	4.07	4.36	5.6
Maize	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.001	0.012
Soybeans	0.0	0.0	0.0006	0.0012	0.0014

Source: Etekpe, Emmanuel, http://www.vanguardorg.com/2016/nigeria.

While production of rice and maize relatively increased during the period, that of wheat and soybeans declined (Table 5). Furthermore, whereas the export was abysmal, imports grew steadily to the point that Nigeria imported 2.5 million metric tons (MT) of rice and 5.6 MT of wheat in 2015. The Table 5 clearly confirmed an earlier assertion that `Nigeria is now a consuming, instead of producing and exporting country`. On general imports, Nigeria import 60.4

percent year-on-year at 175,637.99 million from 1981 to N774.998 million in September 2016 (Etebeke, 2016). The main import partners are China, Belgium, Netherlands, and USA.

Vaughan, et al (2014:17) studied the gaps between major imported and exported commodities in Nigeria between 2006–2010. They found evident that Nigeria is a net importer for most of the commodities in the period (Table 6). The country had positive difference only on cocoa, and oils and oil seeds.

Table 6: Estimated Gaps between major Imported and Exported Commodities (2006 – 2010) (N billion).

Commodity	Average Import/Year	Average Export/Year	Difference
Wheat	164.77	-	(164.77)
Prepared Cereals	31.92	1.69	(30.23)
Fish	113.63	22.96	(90.67)
Sugar	38.61	1.22	(37.39)
Dairy	62.51	1.73	(60.78)
Rice	54.24	-	(54.24)
Cocoa	0.66	101.71	101.05
Oil & Oil Seeds	26.06	32.13	6.07
Vegetable & Fruits	22.40	15.42	(6.98)

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate deficit.
Source: Vaughan, Afolami, Oyekale and Ayegbokiki (2014:7) "International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management (IJECM) (Vol. 2(9), September.

The gap in Table 6 is unacceptable and Nigerian farmers have to turn around the gap in favour of the country. This is important for the federal government because the forecast

Table 7: Food Imports forecast for 2015 and 2020 ('000 MT)

Commodity	2015	2020
Wheat	4,294.51	5,035.58
Fish	3,917.06	4,645.20
Rice	1,296.25	1,380.55
Sugar	752.17	774.72
Milk	93.63	120.58
Prepared Cereals	362.47	466.08
Vegetables & Fruits	363.79	480.59

Source: Vaughan, et al (2014:19). IJECM, Vol. 2(9), September .

What is worrisome about the "food imports forecast" in Table 7 is that the prices are not static; they are always rising and points serious financial burden on the country (Vaughan, etal, 2014). This is where the *CAABA model* comes in to forestall tight food supplies, higher prices and increased volatility (Konandreas, 2012 and Isoun & Isoun, 2013).

3 THE COMMUNAL –AGRO-ALLIED-BASED-AGRICULTURE (CAABA) MODEL

1) An Overview. The model hinges on agriculture to play a pivotal role in reconstructing the disarticulated local economies, and to recall, it is based on three cardinal issues: increasing agricultural productivity to produce food for consumption and raw materials for domestic SMEs and export, reducing poverty, and unemployment (PPU). This (PPU) represents an ideological shift from oil and gas-based to that of agriculture-based economy,

The starting point of the *CAABA model* is the improvement of subsistence farming and fishing, with emphasis on palm oil and kernel, cassava, plantain, rice, yam, livestock, vegetables, raffia, catfish, and shrimps, etc. As earlier pointed out, there exist local expertise and comparable advantage in these aras as the region is primarily an agricultural producer.

This model is important because presently, Nigeria spends an average of US $4.15 (N630) billion on food imports yearly (Table 6). This supports our argument that the agricultural sector had become moribund, and more than 70 percent of urban dwellers go about on empty stomachs. The US$4.15 (N630) billion on food

import can establish about 300 agro-allied companies, and each of the firms would employ about 5,000 Nigerian youths, making a total of 1.5 million employees (Essiet, 2011). As if he had the CAABA model in mind, Essiet urged the federal government to re-channel this fund to reconstructing local and national economies. The emphasis here is not on undue reliance on mechanized agriculture as Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) and Green Revolution (GR) or large scale industries that depend on imported spare parts and raw materials that create few jobs, but on improving subsistence agriculture in progression with the expertise of the farmers. The Large Scale Enterprise (LSEs) do not have backward linkage effects with rural economies and is incongruent with our concept of development. Thus, the model will enhance the creative power of small farmers to mobilize themselves for agricultural ventures (Darah, 2004).

2) **How the Model Works:** This is how the model works. Instead of individuals to own and farm small piece of land or fish in small portion of the creeks, individual farmers or repentant militants, and unemployed youths, are encouraged to form a farming cooperatives of 10 persons. They will pool their resources together and secure larger portions of land to be engaged in variety of agricultural ventures as

estimated in Table 7. They will be further encouraged to live within their farm settlements or nearby villages so as to devote total effort on it the same way civil servants attend to their jobs. The practice will be extended to fishing rights of lakes, etc. The fishes caught may be 'smoked' by fire wood, sold fresh to middlemen, preserved in cold stores to be retailed or sold as processors for canning,. In course of this, the young farmers will attract the attention of government and development partners for financial and technical assistance.

Table 7: Selected Local Agricultural Ventures

S/No	Agricultural Ventures	By-Products
1	Cassava production	Garri, fufu, flour, starch, etc.
2	Crop farming rice, yam, plantain, banana	Grain, plantain chips, stable food, etc,.
3	Food processing and preservation	Processed rice, cassava, fish, yam, etc
4	Grass cutter production	Staple food, dried meat, etc.
5	Snail breeding	Stable delicacy, medicinal , etc
6	Poultry management	Local protein, etc
7	Vegetable production	Varieties
8	Animal feed production	Varieties
9	Palm cutting	Red palm oil, palm kernel oil (PKO) and palm kernel cake (PKC)
10	Shrimps	Fresh or dried.

Source: Author;s Estimate, 2017

It is worth emphasizing that those who do not want to be directly involved in farming may form cooperative for the agro-allied businesses (i.e., By-Products) and

apply for financial support from the micro-financial institutions. The cottage industries that will emerge from the agricultural ventures will have positive multiplier effects and create about 2.6 million new jobs within the first five years of implementing the model as (Table 8).

Table 8: Job Creation Potentials of CAABA Model

S/No	Agricultural Ventures	New Jobs
1	Crop and cash crop activities	350,000
2	Agro enterprises (raw materials, export, etc)	985,000
3	Allied ventures (i.e., processing, preservation, etc,)	380,000
4	Distribution	880,000
	Total	2,595,500

Source: Author's Estimate, 2017

In discussing the philosophy of the CAABA model, Etekpe and Iyang (2008) argued that:

> *In CAABA model, development starts with planning for the formation of agricultural cooperatives (clusters or cells), and how to encourage them to produce higher yields. In the process of farming together*

as cooperatives, appropriate technology will evolve as necessity…. This process is applicable to entrepreneurs for cottage industries, etc., and the vocation will become an occupation and primitive tools give way for appropriate implements. This means, it is the operators, instead of bureaucrats, that will determine the progression from subsistence to semi-mechanization and eventually mechanization. The pace is dictated by the farmers where each phase will propel the emergence of several other cottage industries, including developed exchange…. The beauty is that while some of the output is consumed as food, the surplus will form raw materials such as preservation (cold room), processing and secondly, for exchange.

What this means is that technology will no longer be monopllized by the local bourgeoisies, but found on the farmers' own innovative ability shown at Figure 1(Dickson 1940). Thus, increases in output (productivity) has to be accompanied by local re-investment to enable the farmers define their own technological needs as to control the mode of production. This will be accompanied by small scale rural labour intensive industrialization, instead of the present lopsided large-scale capital intensive industry in few state capitals

The CAABA model is diagrammatically presented in Figure 3.



Figure 3: CAABAS Model of Reconstructing the Local Economies

What is unique is that the three phases in Figure 3 (i.e., communal farming/fishing , wealth creation through production of food and raw materials, and SMEs are linked to each other and is capable of creating the already outlined 2.6 million new jobs for the 22.4 million unemployed people in the region in the first 3 years of the programme It will also stimulate economic growth and interface with government agencies such as Nigerian Content Development Board (NCDB) to bring about implementation of the local content laws. The law has provision for:

a) employment of people in the local communities;
b) OPCS becoming stakeholders in oil and gas industry;
c) financial assistance for agriculture, cottage industry, and cooperatives for communities that are impacted (by activities of MNOCs);
d) converting payments of compensations by MNOCs to establishment of skills acquisition and entrepreneurship development centres; and
e) OPCs monitoring oil and gas activities in the region.

The other institution for collaboration is the Agricultural Projects Monitoring and Evaluation Unit (APMEU) of the Federal Department of Agriculture (FDA). The APMEU was established in 1975 as a specialized unit to render technical services to farmers to improve their performance and effectiveness of CAABA model. The APMEU has two regional offices in Kaduna and Benin city, and three desk offices in Jos, Lokoja and Enugu. Interestingly,

APMEU works directly with the State Agricultural Development Projects (ADPs). The essence of the collaboration is for improvement of yield of, for example, rice from the present 7 tons per hectare to 10-12 tons per hectare, in line with what Vietnam and Thailand are getting from the Mekong delta in China (Etekpe, 2009:15-17). The other reasons is for the design of 'appropriate technology', especially for processing and storage facilities (Dickson, 1974).

The model shall also liaise with the Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC) for the produce/products from CAABA model to be exported to African, European and American markets. The NEPC is encouraging Nigerian agriculturalist, industries, and businessman to export more non-oil products as to grow the country's export index, create jobs and stabilize the local and national economy. Presently, most of the non-oil exports are cocoa, palm oil, cassava, rubber, cashew, etc. (Table 6).

Interestingly, NEPC published 50 hot selling things to export from Nigeria to other countries on 31 December 2016. The list has 37 food items, including all the 10 items and their by-products in Table 7. This is a cheering information on the practicability and usefulness of the model. Shrimps, for example, is abundant in the Niger delta region and the demand is high in countries like USA, Europe, Spain, France, Portugal and Belgium. Already, we know that cassava is food for all in Nigeria because of the various

methods of preparing it, and is in high demand both in Europe, Middle East and America. The NEPC emphasized that there is huge market for snail if produced in large quantity. Snails are hotcake in Europe and America. The good thing about it is that it is very easy to rear as it produces rapidly with inexpensive feeding.

1) **Experiences of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta States.** The model has taken-off in one form or the other in some of the BRACED states in the region, especially Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states. In Rivers state, it was known as School-to-Land (STL) programme in the 1980s where unemployed secondary school leavers were gathered and given one month orientation training at Iriebe farm near Port Harcourt. During the training, the trainees were made to state their areas of interests in any of the crops (plantain, banana, rice , yam, fishery and poultry, etc). After the training and proper screening, they were deployed to different parts of the state, i.e., Bori (yam), Okordia (plantain), Brass (fishing), Peremabiri (rice), etc where hectares of virgin lands were allocated to them to start their farms. The state government built temporary farm offices and the people lived in the nearby villages. The government also provided machetes, and related implements. The young farmers were supervised by farm managers who were, in turn, supported by extension staff of the State Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR).

At harvest time, the produce were sold at open market rate and

applied to repay the services rendered by government, and the balance retained to sustain the farm and young farmers. Any of the farmers were at liberty to withdraw his/her service to form their own cooperative farm and secure land elsewhere and become self-reliant. Such persons were then replaced by new entrants. Thus, the reciprocal process, i.e. leaving to form new cooperatives and replacing such persons, generated positive multiplier effects that made the state self-sufficient in food production.

When Bayelsa state was created out of the Rivers state in 1996, the new state introduced the STL programme and planned to re-invigorate 7 demonstration farms at Peremabiri, Sabageria, Oporoma, Ofoni, Abobiri, Nembe, and Yenagoa to produce disease resistant crops and foods. They were also to train unemployed youths to start their own farms. The state government entered into agreement with Chinese firms for the supply of fishing trawlers for deep sea fishing at Okpoama and Twon Brass of the state. It is unfortunate that all these agricultural programmes have given way for oil and gas industry (Bullard, 2003; Etekpe and Okolo, 2011).

It seems the former Delta state governor, Dr. Emmanuel Eweta Uduaghan came across my preliminary reports on the CAABA model when he launched the programme of 'Delta beyond oil' in 2014. The thrust of the programme was the Delta state providing

the needed support, encouragement, specialized interest-free loans dedicated to micro, small and medium businesses. In addition, the ADPs offered a combination of services – capacity building, networking and peer support to the participants of the programme. For Uduaghan, the main aim is for them to migrate from micro businesses to SMEs, MSEs and LSEs, and he sought for the cooperation of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

As Ikeje (2015:9) wrote, 'today, shoemakers, palm oil producers, graduate fish farmers among other entrepreneurs are helping to drive the governor Uduaghan administration's vision of a state running on its peoples' resources rather than crude oil, and …. cottage industries are becoming visible from micro businesses.' Whereas this paper is not an assessment of the success story of the programme, what is important is that it has spurred once economically weak farmers or entrepreneurs to become vibrant business owners driving the growth of the state economy outside crude oil. The culture of sharing the nation's oil revenue is gradually replaced with a state wide entrepreneurial drive. This is yielding positive results because micro businesses in the state are growing into cottage industries. This experiences of Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states in the region shows that CAABA model is a catalyst to propel economic survival at post oil era in the region

It should be emphasized that for the model to achieve the desired aims, there need to embark on value orientation for people to shift their mindset from the oil/gas industry to agriculture as 'catalyst of development'. This will necessitate changing the structure and curriculum of education, especially at primary and secondary school levels so that the school community shall consist of people who are both teachers and farmers, instead of those who are only interested in 'white collar jobs' (Etekpe and Inyang, 2008). The campaign has to explain the CAABA model to parents and pupils at the beginning of the academic year until it is internalized to avoid confusion.

It is worth stating that the model is different from that of President Julius Nyerere's *ujamaa* farms where government was directly involved in the production and distribution processes(1976). In CAABA, government is not directly involved, apart from providing land and critical social infrastructure. The farmers are in control and sell their produce at open market.



Figure 4, Produce/Products of CAABA model

4 CONCLUSION

This address concludes that the greatest challenge confronting the region and country is how to gainfully train and absorb 26,361 amnested persons, as well as provide career or job opportunities for the 22.4 million unemployed persons in the region. That is where the CAABA model comes in to reconstruct the disoriented local economies to fill the gap so that both under-employed and unemployed persons would not be lured to back to creeks to resume 'guerrilla warfare' in the region.

In the light of this exigency, to revive the economy of Niger delta, it is imperative to adopt the CAABA model. The model is about revamping agriculture that hitherto sustained the region and country. The model will stimulate the emergence of SMEs in the areas of palm kernel oil and cake (PKO/PKC), cassava flour and starch, rice mill, etc to create about 2.6 million new jobs within the first 5 years it is implemented, beginning with Bayelsa state

There is no doubt that at the initial stage of implementing the CAABA model, it shall encounter some difficulties, but they are

surmountable through prolonged value orientation campaigns. The Lecture wish to conclude that:

1) If the federal government solves the problems of local economy and rural development, the issue of militancy/insecurity will be a thing of the past in the region;

2) There should be a comprehensive legal framework for the protection of the Niger Delta environment because without an environmental protection, agriculture and its allied ventures will not strive;

3) There is an urgent need for steady electrification to preserve/store the farm produce, such as fruits, fishes, etc;

4) The indigenous people become co-owners and actively involved in oil ventures where their land and resources should be valued as equity contribution so that the local people can effectively monitor and control the activities of MNOCs operating in the region;

5) MNOCs convert payments of compensation to communities to establish skills acquisition and entrepreneurship development centres; and

6) The Niger delta (BRACED) states resuscitate BRACED, a regional Commission to coordinate plans and projects in the areas of infrastructural and human capital development, peace and security, etc, the same way Oodua Group in South West and Arewa Consultative Forum in Northern Nigerian coordinate strategic economic planning for their people. This is important as each state in the region has so much untapped natural resources other than crude oil and gas. The Commission has to be driven by private sector operatives as against the present politicians driving it in order to take an holistic view of how the region would resuscitate the local economies to absorb about 22.45 million unemployed persons, particularly youths, reduce poverty from the present level of 75 percent

7) There is a strong relation between CAABA model and the economic survival of the region without oil.

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